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'There's nothing really they can do with this information': unpacking how users manage privacy boundaries for personal fitness information

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ABSTRACT

Fitness trackers are an increasingly popular tool for tracking one's health and physical activity. While research has evaluated how these mobile devices can improve health and well-being, few studies have empirically evaluated users' privacy concerns that stem from the collection, aggregation, and sharing of personal fitness information (PFI). In this paper, we endeavor to gain a more complete picture of users' experiences with fitness trackers and how they manage the privacy of personal fitness information. Using Communication Privacy Management (CPM) as a theoretical framework, we describe findings from survey and interview data regarding the benefits and drawbacks users perceive from using a fitness tracker, as well as how privacy concerns and behaviors map onto user strategies for managing privacy boundaries related to personal fitness information. We conclude by discussing how our findings contribute to theory and future information policy related to the growing wearable device ecosystem.

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Fitness trackers; personal fitness information; privacy; communication privacy management; quantified self

Introduction

Fitness trackers are increasingly popular. A 2012 Pew Research Center survey found that just 5.4% of Americans use a mobile app or online tool to track their weight, diet, or exercise routine (Fox & Duggan, 2013). By 2016, Accenture reported that 21% of Americans owned a wearable device and 33% used one or more health apps on their mobile device (Safavi & Webb, 2016). Fitness trackers may provide numerous benefits to users, including an increased awareness about their daily activity and social features to help them stick to a fitness plan. These devices are a major part of the 'quantified self' movement, which focuses on empowering individuals to measure and evaluate metrics about their bodies.

Designed to be worn unobtrusively on the body, fitness trackers collect data in an ambient manner with little effort from the user. The miniaturisation and ubiquity of smartphone and mobile sensors allow people to use one device to track several aspects of their bodies (e.g., steps taken, floors climbed, distance traveled, calories burned, time

slept, heart rate, location). These data points, known as ‘personal fitness information’ (PFI), may seem innocuous; however, over time, PFI may reveal insights about people’s health and habits – especially when combined with other data sources (Christovich, 2016; Peppet, 2014; Raj, Ghosh, Kumar, & Srivastava, 2011).

The mobile and networked nature of fitness trackers means that they constantly collect and share user data (Crawford, Lingel, & Karppi, 2015); many devices connect to partner mobile apps or other third parties. As of late 2018, Fitbit’s website lists nearly forty compatible third-party apps (Fitbit, 2018b) and encourages developers to use Fitbit’s API to create apps that integrate with Fitbit’s data (Fitbit, 2018a). Data sharing can happen automatically, such as when a fitness tracker syncs with a partner mobile app and sends the user’s data to the company’s servers, or when users actively share their data with others, such as syncing their fitness tracker with a social network site. Beyond these examples, fitness tracker companies may also share or sell users’ data with third parties (Fitbit, 2016; Ho, Novick, & Yeung, 2014; Jawbone, 2014), prosecutors may introduce evidence gleaned from fitness trackers into court proceedings (Alba, 2016; Crawford, 2014; Hauser, 2018; Snyder, 2015), and medical and insurance providers increasingly seek access to fitness tracker data (Barlyn, 2018; Farr, 2017a, 2017b). As a result, some privacy advocates warn of an emerging ‘medical surveillance system’ (Farr, 2015).

Despite these growing occurrences of third-party use of PFI, little research has considered how users balance the benefits of wearable devices with the privacy risks of sharing highly detailed data streams about their physical activity. In this paper, we provide a more complete picture of users’ experiences with fitness trackers and how they manage the privacy boundaries surrounding personal fitness information. Using Communication Privacy Management theory (CPM) (Petronio, 2002) as a theoretical framework, we describe findings from survey and interview data regarding the benefits and drawbacks that users perceive from using a fitness tracker, as well as how privacy concerns and behaviors map onto user strategies for managing privacy boundaries related to personal fitness information. We conclude by discussing how our findings contribute to theory and future information policy related to user-generated data from smartphones, wearables, and other mobile devices.

Research on self-tracking and personal fitness information (PFI)

A growing body of research has emerged on self-tracking, including fitness trackers, with numerous researchers exploring how users integrate self-tracking into their daily lives and how the use of fitness trackers impact how they define themselves and their relationships with others (see, for example, Kristensen & Ruckenstein, 2018; Lomborg, Thylstrup, & Schwartz, 2018; Pantzar & Ruckenstein, 2015). In particular, Lomborg and Frandsen (2016) reveal how the experiential value and meaning of self-tracking practices are shaped by both the motivations of individual users as well as the communicative features of the tracking technology.

The affordances of fitness trackers, they suggest, play a large role in shaping how individuals use and relate to their devices. This insight is evident when examining the specific data practices of users engaged in self-tracking. Lupton (2016), for example, identifies five modes of self-tracking that relate to different data-sharing conditions – private, communal, pushed, imposed, and exploited. These conditions vary based on how tracking platforms

provide notice and obtain consent regarding how data is being collected, on what data is collected, and how it is being used (p. 143). Lupton and Michael (2017) further reveal how the particular context of data collection and use strongly determines users' concern about digital tracking and surveillance.

Studies focusing specifically on fitness tracker users confirm this. Research has suggested that users of fitness trackers do not express many privacy concerns about data collection of PFI (Gorm & Shklovski, 2016). Motti and Caine (2015) surmise that users' lack of concern with fitness trackers stems from a lack of awareness of how companies' collection of granular data about users over long periods of time can compromise privacy. Other studies have revealed that users' privacy concerns differ based on the type of data collected, with greater concern placed on the collection of video or audio data, location data, mood or stress level data, and data related to conversational behavior (Klasnja, Consolvo, Choudhury, Beckwith, & Hightower, 2009; Motti & Caine, 2015; Patterson, 2013). Fitbit users are also cautious about the collection of detailed health information like glucose level or blood pressure (Patterson, 2013). Following Lupton and Michael (2017), however, these concerns may be tempered by factors related to the context of use, as well as the treatment of data collected. For example, one user study found that people were more willing to provide GPS and audio data to a tracker if the system deleted the data after a predetermined period of time (Klasnja et al., 2009).

The current study contributes to this growing body of research by presenting a nuanced look at how privacy issues for fitness tracker users fit within the wider network of perceived device benefits and drawbacks, while also providing an understanding of how users might mitigate such privacy concerns by managing data flows within the personal fitness ecosystem. To guide our work, we rely on Petronio's (2002) theory of Communication Privacy Management (CPM), which we summarize below.

Theoretical framework: communication privacy management

Derlega and Chaikin describe privacy as a 'process of boundary regulation that controls the degree of contact an individual maintains with others' (1977, p. 1). Individuals frequently regulate these boundaries in social relationships through adjustments to the transmission and sharing of personal information. This control of information exchange typically defines the amount of privacy present in a relationship both theoretically and pragmatically. Elaborating on the notion of privacy as regulated by boundaries, Petronio (2002) presents a theory of Communication Privacy Management (CPM) to explain the decisions people make when disclosing (or concealing) private information. As a boundary management theory, CPM argues that individuals engage in a 'mental calculus' when making decisions about whether to disclose a piece of personal information, with ongoing interplays between pressures to reveal and to conceal information.

Petronio (2002, 2013) suggests that individuals manage the tensions between public and private disclosures by establishing boundaries that are constantly negotiated and coordinated depending upon contextual factors. These boundaries are negotiated within CPM through three core elements: (1) ownership, (2) information control via privacy rules, and (3) turbulence. First, Petronio notes that individuals maintain 'ownership' of their private

information, even after it is shared with others. She provides the concept of thick versus thin boundaries to unpack this ownership. For example, personal secrets such as one's sexual history might have very thick boundaries, while personal information frequently shared with others, such as one's home address, may have thinner boundaries.

Individuals control how their personal information is shared by actively negotiating 'privacy rules' with others who might have (or wish to have) access to a piece of personal information. The goal of these rules is to help people understand when, where, and with whom it is acceptable to share a piece of private information. Privacy rules vary based on the particular relationship, as well as on cultural and contextual factors, as well as risk-benefit calculations (Petronio, 2002).

Finally, CPM theory assumes that privacy rules might break down, leading to 'privacy turbulence' between the owners of a piece of information and a breakdown of trust between the original owner of the information and those who violated a privacy rule (Petronio & Durham, 2008). When this happens, individuals must recalibrate their privacy rules to avoid future turbulence - or dissolve the relationship if the violation was severe enough, assuming dissolution is even possible.

Communication researchers have applied CPM in various contexts where privacy negotiations occur between two parties, including romantic partners (Durham, 2008; Steuber & Solomon, 2011), families (Toller & McBride, 2013), healthcare providers and patients (Petronio & Kovach, 1997), and victims of sexual abuse (Petronio, Reeder, Hecht, & Ros-Mendoza, 1996). More recently, CPM is being applied to contexts where privacy boundaries are managed within mobile, online, and social media environments (Child, Haridakis, & Petronio, 2012; Jin, 2013; Metzger, 2007; Waters & Ackerman, 2011; Yang & Pulido, 2016). Since self-tracking involves several data sharing conditions and various potential recipients of information (Lupton, 2016), we find CPM a useful framework for exploring how fitness tracker users manage boundaries around the sharing of personal fitness information. Here, we use CPM to identify users' perceptions and behaviors regarding data ownership, privacy rules, and turbulence to gain insights into how users negotiate the disclosure and sharing of PFI.

Unpacking how users of fitness trackers manage privacy boundaries of their PFI

In this study, we endeavor to gain a more complete picture of users' experiences with fitness trackers and how they manage privacy boundaries regarding the sharing and disclosure of personal fitness information. As noted above, little research on fitness trackers has focused on data privacy; in the few studies that have addressed privacy issues, users expressed little concern about their PFI (Gorm & Shklovski, 2016; Motti & Caine, 2015). However, these studies did not evaluate how privacy concerns fit into the wider ecosystem of device benefits and drawbacks, or the strategies users may employ to minimize privacy risks. Therefore, we guide our analyses with the following research questions:

RQ1: What benefits and drawbacks do users experience from using fitness trackers?

RQ2: Do users of fitness trackers have concerns about privacy and personal fitness information?

RQ3: What actions, if any, do users take to manage privacy boundaries regarding the sharing and disclosure of personal fitness information?

Method

To address our RQs, we used a mixed-method approach involving a survey and semi-structured interviews with current users of fitness trackers. In this paper, we focus primarily on the qualitative data gathered through interviews with 33 Fitbit and Jawbone users and only include survey data only when it complements or contextualises the interviews. Participants were first recruited through emails to a random sample of 6,000 university employees across two American public universities. They were invited to complete an online survey if they were at least 18 years old, owned a smartphone, and currently used a Fitbit or Jawbone device. At the end of the survey, respondents could provide contact information to participate in a follow-up interview and to enter a drawing for one of five \$50 Amazon gift cards.

From 363 completed surveys, 141 participants stated they would be willing to participate in an interview. We used criterion sampling (Patton, 2005) to maximize diversity across our participants across two primary factors: degree of privacy concerns and perceived internet skills. To do this, we first looked at survey items that captured participants' privacy concerns - using a measure of internet privacy concerns (Vitak, 2016) and mobile data concerns (Xu, Gupta, Rosson, & Carroll, 2012) - as well as their internet skills (Hargittai & Hsieh, 2012) and fitness tracker use (both frequency of use and engagement in social features). We then created four categories of users along two axes: skills and concerns. This led to pools of participants who self-reported as (1) high skills, high concerns, (2) high skills, low concerns, (3) low skills, high concerns, and (4) low skills, low concerns. We excluded anyone who fell into the midpoint for both categories or who reported rarely using their fitness tracker.

During March and April 2017, we invited potential interviewees in batches, starting with those who most strongly reflected our selection criteria in each of the four categories. As interviews were scheduled and conducted, we invited additional participants to ensure we had a similar number of participants across each group. At the conclusion of data collection, we had interviewed 33 people across the two universities: eight had High Skills/Low Concerns, 11 had High Skills/High Concerns, six had Low Skills/Low Concerns, and eight had Low Skills/High Concerns. See [Table 1](#) for descriptive data on each of the 33 participants and [Figure 1](#) for general mapping of participants across skill and concern measures. Each participant received a US \$15 Amazon gift card upon completion of the interview.

Limitations

We acknowledge some limitations of this study. First, because our sample was drawn from university staff, it is significantly more educated than the general population and perhaps more than the specific population of fitness tracker users. This could introduce bias in results related to participants' general understanding of digital privacy concerns and how to mitigate them. That said, we believe the findings presented here provide useful insights to guide future studies utilizing a broader sample population. As with all interview

Table 1. Descriptive data of 33 interview participants.

ID	Internet skills scale ^a	General privacy concern ^b	Mobile data concern ^c	Tracker frequency of use	Sex	Age	User category
P43	4.4	5	5	Every day	F	39	High Skills/High Concerns
P48	4.8	2.55	2.75	Most days	M	26	High Skills/Low Concerns
P56	5	3.18	3.88	Every day	F	46	High Skills/Low Concerns
P65	3.2	1.36	3.13	Every day	M	33	Low Skills/Low Concerns
P69	4.8	1.45	4	Every day	F	55	High Skills/Low Concerns
P71	3.5	4.27	4.25	Every day	F	27	Low Skills/High Concerns
P75	5	2.82	2.88	Every day	M	34	High Skills/Low Concerns
P82	3.3	1.73	4	Every day	F	30	Low Skills/Low Concerns
P96	4.7	3.09	5	Most days	F	35	High Skills/High Concerns
P123	3.1	4	3.25	Most days	F	23	Low Skills/High Concerns
P128	4.1	5	5	Every day	F	52	High Skills/High Concerns
P175	3.9	2.27	2.25	Every day	F	50	Low Skills/Low Concerns
P184	3.6	2.27	4.75	Every day	F	23	Low Skills/Low Concerns
P194	2.89	4.09	4	Every day	F	57	Low Skills/High Concerns
P209	2.4	3.45	3.5	Every day	F	57	Low Skills/High Concerns
P216	5	4.27	4	Every day	F	66	High Skills/High Concerns
P249	5	4.55	4.13	Every day	F	30	High Skills/High Concerns
P254	2	3.27	4	Every day	M	42	Low Skills/High Concerns
P257	4.7	1.45	3.25	Every day	F	41	High Skills/Low Concerns
P259	1.6	1.45	2.88	Every day	M	26	High Skills/High Concerns
P261	4.9	4.82	4.88	Every day	F	56	High Skills/High Concerns
P299	3.1	4.27	4.63	Every day	M	51	Low Skills/High Concerns
P304	2.8	4.91	4	Most days	F	33	Low Skills/High Concerns
P323	5	4.27	4.13	Most days	M	34	High Skills/High Concerns
P324	5	1.91	3.5	Every day	M	33	High Skills/Low Concerns
P326	3.9	2.91	4.25	Every day	F	38	Low Skills/Low Concerns
P356	3.2	1.64	3.63	Every day	F	35	High Skills/Low Concerns
P371	4.9	4.45	3.38	Most days	F	25	High Skills/High Concerns
P383	3	1.27	2.25	Every day	F	61	Low Skills/Low Concerns
P401	5	1.18	4	Every day	F	51	High Skills/Low Concerns
P408	5	5	4.38	Every day	F	45	High Skills/High Concerns
P437	2.5	4	4.63	Every day	F	64	Low Skills/High Concerns
P439	5	4.82	4.63	Every day	F	34	High Skills/High Concerns
	Mean (SD) = 3.95 (1.05)	Mean (SD) = 3.24 (1.33)	Mean (SD) = 3.88 (0.76)		F (80%) M (20%)	Mean (SD) = 41 (12.7)	

^aInternet Skills Scale (perceived): 10 items averaged, 1 = Low Skills; 5 = High Skills

^bPrivacy Concerns Scale: 12 items averaged, 1 = Low Concerns, 5 = High Concerns

^cMobile Data Concerns: 9 items averaged, 1 = Less Agreement, 5 = More agreement with items about data loss on mobile

studies, our goal was not generalizability to the wider population of fitness tracker users, but to provide a deep and rich accounting of how users managed their device and their PFI.

Data analysis

Following data collection, each interview was transcribed and uploaded to the qualitative analysis program Dedoose to enable iterative coding by multiple research team members (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). The authors first discussed a set of potential codes to include in the codebook based on the theoretical framing, interview protocol, and research goals of the project. Each then independently coded two interviews and met to discuss




Figure 1. Internet skills and privacy concerns of participants.

and update the codebook. Each transcript was coded by two authors using the finalised codebook to ensure consistency and validate results. Finally, we exported excerpts from each code to Excel and further analysed them to identify trends in the data (Miles, Huberman, & Saldaña, 2013).

Findings

RQ1: Benefits of Fitness Tracker Use

The survey revealed that 70% of respondents use their fitness trackers every day, and they perceived the fitness-related features to be more important than the social features. Using a five-point scale ranging from not important at all to very important, respondents said the most important features were the step counter ($M = 4.81, SD = 0.53$), calorie tracker ($M = 4.34, SD = 1.01$), and workout/activity tracker ($M = 4.02, SD = 1.14$), while the least important features were the ability to compete with others ($M = 2.90, SD = 1.41$) and engage with social features (e.g., messaging, groups, chat) ($M = 2.10, SD = 1.16$). See Table 2 for a full listing of survey respondents’ perceived importance of fitness tracker features.

Follow-up interviews with fitness tracker users confirmed the usage patterns and benefits suggested by the survey responses. Eighty per cent of interviewees ($N = 27$)

Table 2. Perceived importance^a of fitness tracker features ($N = 360$).

	Mean	SD	Median
Steps Counter	4.8	0.52	5
Workout/Activity Tracking	4.3	0.99	4
Clock	4.05	1.33	5
Calories Burned	3.96	1.11	3
Sleep Tracking	3.68	1.34	4
Alarm	3.3	1.43	3
Weight Tracking	3.19	1.28	3
Syncing with Other Apps	3.19	1.43	2
Competition Features (e.g., who can get the most steps in a week)	2.9	1.42	5
Social Features (e.g., messaging, groups, chat)	2.1	1.16	4

^aPerceived Importance: 1 = Not at All Important; 2 = Not That Important; 3 = Neutral; 4 = Important; 5 = Very Important.

reported using their fitness tracker every day, typically removing the device only to shower or charge the battery. For example, P324 said, 'I'm always wearing my fitness tracker, except for the things you can't, like taking a shower, swimming, that sort of thing. ... Last year, I think there was one day when I didn't have it.' P194 justified her constant use - only taking it off to shower - because she wanted 'to get credit for every step.'

Along these lines, fitness tracking devices acted as strong motivators in many interviewees' lives, where the presence of the device encouraged greater physical activity. Many participants noted how the devices made them more aware and more accountable regarding their level of activity, particularly when the devices 'nudged' them into action - some, but not all devices come equipped with reminder functions to prompt regular physical activity throughout the day. P123 described this perception of accountability by saying, 'I thought by getting a Fitbit, it would keep me accountable with the steps and being able to be aware of approximately how many calories I'm burning, things like that. It definitely helps to keep me accountable.' P324 echoed this sentiment, saying his Fitbit served as a mental reminder to get up and move more often: 'It's sort of the nice friend that tells you, "Hey, let's go out and do something."'

Many fitness trackers collect a variety of fitness data beyond steps, and some interview participants cited sleep tracking as a major benefit of owning these devices. P439 noted she has 'really bad sleeping patterns' and wanted to use her Fitbit to get data on her sleep quality. While some interviewees opted to charge their device overnight, several indicated that sleep tracking was their primary use of the device. P299 indicated that his device had significantly improved his sleep quality, which he was suffering due to working off-hour shifts: 'I'm pretty dialed into my sleep and that's because of this. The step part of it is a nicety but not ... just 'cause I'm pretty active otherwise.'

Other benefits interviewees expressed included weight loss, increased endurance, feeling healthier, and a sense of making positive life choices. And while survey respondents rated the social aspects of fitness trackers of lowest importance ($M = 2.10$, $SD = 1.16$), numerous interview participants said the social functions help motivate them to exercise more. For example, P71 noted:

I have a couple of friends who do a lot, a lot of steps so it kinda motivates me to do more too. ... sometimes I'll look and I'm like, "Yeah, I didn't take a morning walk today. I should probably do something."

RQ1: Drawbacks of Fitness Tracker Use

While some of our participants expressed minor technological frustrations with their fitness tracker - including perceptions of imprecise step counts, skin irritations, lack of waterproofing, battery issues, or that their tracker lacked features available in more current models - few mentioned any significant drawbacks from owning a device. A few participants expressed frustration with the tracker's tendency to 'nudge' users to get up and move each hour, feeling it was a bit intrusive at times.

Other drawbacks centered on the social and competitive functions of fitness trackers. Overall, our survey respondents rated the social functionality of fitness trackers as the least important feature. And while many interviewees had positive experiences with the social aspects of their fitness devices, a few complained about the small size of their social

network within the app. Others were wary of the shaming and over-competitive aspects of sharing personal fitness information across social networks. For example, P371 described why she stopped engaging with the social and competitive features of the app, saying:

I stopped looking at [other people's stats] because it makes me feel bad. I have a lot of [Ultimate] Frisbee friends that use a Fitbit and they walk a lot more than I do. ... I have stopped looking at that out of slight embarrassment, even though I know I don't wear my Fitbit all the time. ... If anything, it's just the interconnected sharing my data with other people feels slightly shaming sometimes, which I guess is the point. I'm not the hugest fan of that necessarily. (P 371)

P194 described the activity comparisons and competition features in similar terms, saying she sometimes felt a 'backlash' from not doing as well as friends she followed through the app. Still others expressed an overall distaste for the social aspects of owning a fitness tracker and consciously chose not to share their PFI with anyone. P216 said she turns down any connection requests she receives because, 'I don't care about sharing. I'm not a 'share' person. This is mine. I don't care what they do and I don't want them to care what I do.' Likewise, P439 described her Fitbit data in terms of ownership, saying, 'Fitness stuff is for me, not for everybody else.' Considered through the lens of CPM, a thick boundary encircled this user's PFI, and thus she was less likely to share ownership with others.

RQ2: Privacy Concerns Regarding Fitness Trackers and Personal Fitness Information

Most participants expressed only minimal privacy concerns related to their use of a fitness tracker. When asked if they had any privacy concerns related to their tracker, one-third of the interviewees quickly and simply said no.

A few participants admitted they were largely unaware of any broader privacy issues related to using a fitness tracker. For example, P257 had heard about a woman using Fitbit data in a lawsuit and thought, 'Oh. This information could be used, really, beyond myself. Is this information that I would like to have tracked?' Likewise P261 said she felt she 'should be more concerned about' the data she shares with Fitbit, but that she tends to ignore such feelings:

It has crossed my mind, what if this information were shared with an insurance company or it impacted my health care in some way, or my ability to obtain health care in some way? It's crossed my mind, and then I dismiss it. (P261)

Others expressed general ambivalence, stating, 'I know there are some issues with privacy, but I'm not as concerned about that' (P96). Their comments suggested that they did not feel their PFI was so sensitive that it required them to take time and define rules to govern the boundary around it.

Regarding the relative sensitivity of personal fitness information, survey respondents expected that they would feel only average levels of concern (evaluated on a scale of 0–100) if their fitness tracker data were compromised in something like a security breach ($M = 54.44$, $SD = 29.26$). Nearly half of our interviewees did not perceive PFI to be valuable and did not sense that sharing such data could potentially harm them. For example, P371 felt that Fitbit was 'fairly innocuous.' Others did not express concern at the idea of someone seeing the data; for example, P69 said, 'If this information was public, I wouldn't be

upset by it. If anybody wants to know how much water I drink, wow, they need to get a life.'

These participants did not feel that disclosing their PFI could result in boundary turbulence. However, a few interviewees provided a qualified version of this 'who cares?' perspective. They preferred that PFI was not shared with others, but they also did not perceive such sharing to be a concern. For example, P56 said, 'I guess if anybody were to see it, they're not going to ... There's nothing really they can do with that information, but I just like knowing that I have it set and only a few people can see it.' These participants appeared to prefer a thicker boundary around PFI, but did not feel that its disclosure could result in turbulence.

Numerous interviewees noted, however, that privacy concerns would emerge if their fitness tracker was collecting or sharing personal information beyond just steps taken, such as personal identifiers or location data. P123 'wouldn't really mind' if data about her steps, calories, or sleep was 'out there.' But she felt concerned about this data including her email or physical address because this would give people a way to contact her. For P65, concerns arose depending on the specificity of the data shared. He was 'happy to share basic information' such as name, general location, or steps, but did not want more granular information, such as birth date or address, to be shared. P75 felt that sharing data that was so granular that it could be used to infer other details about his life was 'crossing the a line.' He continued:

I think, essentially, if you had exactly the number of steps someone took at which time, like, minute or something, you can actually work out exactly what they did and it kinda gets into the personal space where they got up in the morning and then went to the bathroom ... I don't want it to be that granular level. I think that, kind of, invades my personal space where something personal to me being exposed to someone else. (P75)

Other interviewees clearly stated that it would be a privacy concern if the tracker collected specific, GPS-based, location data. For example, P408 said, 'If it's connecting to the servers in the cloud and pinpointing my location, then I would be worried.' P326 seemed unsure about whether her device captured her location, but acknowledged it would be 'super creepy ... especially because I walk a lot at night by myself.'

Various interviewees took a more utilitarian perspective when considering privacy concerns related to the collection and use of their personal fitness information, suggesting that concerns would be minimised if they could realise some benefit of the data collection.

It all depends on what their purpose is for collecting it. If it benefits me by them collecting it, like if they can collect it and then show me how it impacts my life or relates with other things, then it's useful. Then I have no problem with that. But if it's just so they can build and sell the data, I don't agree with that. (P65)

On the other hand, some interviewees said they trusted their fitness tracker company, which tended to alleviate any potential privacy concerns. For example:

I don't have any reason to not trust [Fitbit]. I haven't heard anything bad about them. There hasn't been any information out there about any breach of the data that they collect. I'm sure that when I did the set-up it had a whole privacy statement and all that kind of stuff on it. If I had had any concerns about it, I probably wouldn't have set it up. (P69)

They did not, however, report thinking actively about questions of trusting the company. For example, P82 acknowledged that Fitbit had a lot of data about her, and she wondered, ‘how susceptible it is to a hack or something,’ but she hadn’t ‘really thought about how it could be potentially used against me.’ P96 wasn’t sure if this was a ‘matter of trust or just, like, not worrying as much about [Fitbit] because they’re smaller’ than companies like Google and Facebook, which ‘touch everything on the internet.’

In summary, some interviewees appeared to have basic privacy rules surrounding their PFI, identifying that turbulence could arise if certain types of information were collected at an unexpected level of granularity. They appeared to be giving the companies that manage their PFI the benefit of the doubt, withholding concern until they had a reason to fear boundary turbulence.

RQ3: Actions Taken to Manage Privacy Boundaries Regarding the Sharing and Disclosure of Personal Fitness Information

In line with their general lack of strong privacy concerns regarding their PFI described above, our interview participants also reported taking limited actions to manage the privacy of their PFI. While a few participants described taking steps to protect their privacy on their device – for example, P96 said, ‘First time I sign up for anything I go through all the privacy settings and make sure they’re pretty locked down’ – many interviewees recalled examining the privacy settings of their device when first setting it up, but then said they had not checked or adjusted the settings since then. For example, several participants said they didn’t think they’d checked the settings since first setting up the device. Others could not even remember changing the settings upon receiving the device and assumed the default settings were still in place. P65 noted that while he regularly checks and adjusts privacy settings on other internet platforms, such as Facebook, he doesn’t for his fitness tracking device.

Of those participants who reported adjusting their fitness tracker’s privacy settings, most took steps that limited the flow of PFI. P56 said she went through her Fitbit settings when she set up the device and made everything private so only she could see the data; she has subsequently connected with three other users she knows offline. Other participants described difficulties in adjusting privacy settings due to the limited features on the fitness tracker’s mobile application compared to the settings on the fitness tracker company’s website. For example, at the time of data collection, Fitbit’s mobile app only offered one general privacy setting while its web dashboard let users set privacy levels for 14 different types of information. This is especially problematic because many users exclusively use the mobile app to interact with their PFI; however, the app’s privacy settings did not allow for granular control and were hard to locate. For example, P323 noted:

I can’t remember [having any privacy concerns when setting up my Fitbit] and I wouldn’t have checked what they were collecting. Again, if it’s not very front-facing about it, I’m bad about going in and looking at it. I know I should, but I just get lazy about it, so I don’t think so. And if there was, I may have gone in and changed the settings to say, ‘No, I don’t want you actually doing this,’ or I may have tried and got annoyed and then forgot. (P323)

P259 described a similar experience when setting up a replacement device and reviewing the privacy settings for his account. He expressed frustration that users have to log onto the website to view and change the full set of privacy settings.

This suggests that participants who want to change the privacy rules surrounding their PFI may struggle to navigate the fitness tracker's app and website to do so. However, their general sense that only a thin boundary needs to surround the information may demotivate them from trying to figure out how to adjust the privacy settings.

Discussion

As fitness trackers become more ubiquitous and offer a wider range of features to track health behaviors, users may adopt these technologies without deeply engaging in the data sharing practices or privacy policies of the companies collecting their data. Research suggests that PFI – especially when aggregated with other sources of information – can help create a ‘medical surveillance system’ (Farr, 2015). In this study, we sought to gain insights into users’ experiences with fitness trackers and how they manage privacy boundaries related to personal fitness information. Such an evaluation is especially important in a time when we see a growing number of third parties – such as the insurance industry and law enforcement – gain access to PFI.

RQ1 sought to understand the benefits and drawbacks users perceive from using a fitness tracker, and our interview results revealed that benefits far outweighed any perceived drawbacks. Our interviewees wear their devices nearly constantly and see the device as a motivating presence in their lives. Contrary to reports suggesting that fitness trackers might not improve one's health (Carroll, 2017; Ross, 2016), our participants expressed a variety of (perceived) benefits including weight loss, increased endurance, feeling healthier, and a sense of making positive life choices. Overall, the perceived benefits of using fitness trackers greatly outweigh drawbacks among our participants. Few participants expressed any significant drawbacks, with some mentioning irritation over the social features of their device, including both frustration about the limited size of the social network as well as a general distaste of making one's personal fitness information visible to anyone outside a close network of friends. Thus, while fitness tracker companies highlight the social aspects of their ecosystem – ranging from competing with other users, following friends' fitness goals and activities, and automatically posting daily statistics to one's social media account – our findings suggest that users preferred to keep their personal fitness information relatively close to themselves. As P439 noted: ‘Fitness stuff is for me, not for everybody else.’

RQ2 and RQ3 focused on further unpacking interviewees' privacy concerns and behaviors related to their fitness trackers and PFI. Overall, our participants expressed low levels of privacy concerns, with many suggesting that personal fitness information did not rise to a level of sensitivity that would trigger privacy concerns or privacy-protecting activities. Notably, few participants noted making changes to privacy settings after initially setting up their fitness tracker. Those who did make adjustments tended to limit the flow of personal fitness information.

However, if we consider these findings within the framework of CPM theory (Petronio, 2002), we can see how users' conceptualisations of ownership, privacy rules, and turbulence surrounding their PFI influence how they manage the privacy boundaries around such information. We can also see how shifts in awareness of the way PFI might be combined with other information and/or used by third parties might disrupt users' relative indifference regarding the privacy of their PFI.

Ownership

CPM argues that individuals strive to maintain ‘ownership’ of their private information, even when sharing it with others, and that they frequently erect thick or thin boundaries to manage this ownership. In the context of fitness trackers, our participants noted a strong urge to maintain sole ownership over their personal fitness information: most felt little need to actively share their fitness activities beyond a close social circle. A few participants did construct thick boundaries around this information.

However, participants largely did not see PFI as sensitive, and most appeared to be satisfied with a much thinner boundary. Few participants noted making changes to their default privacy settings, which might be a result of the limited privacy controls provided on the mobile apps that participants frequently used. Thus, while participants preferred to restrict ownership of their PFI, they varied in the degree to which they felt thick boundaries were necessary. For those who do seek to articulate a boundary, the affordances of the platform might limit their ability to do so, or, as discussed in the next session, users may place faith in the default settings – rules – established by their fitness tracker company.

Privacy rules

Within the CPM framework, individuals control how their personal information is shared by actively negotiating ‘privacy rules’ with others who might have (or wish to have) access to a piece of personal information. While interviewees engaged in social aspects of their fitness device (e.g., messaging, groups, chat), their privacy rules appeared to focus on sharing only the most basic fitness data with only close friends. Few were willing to share more detailed information, such as location or weight, and no one suggested that rules might exist to allow broadcasting PFI beyond a close circle of known friends. Interviewees created distinct privacy rules for different types of PFI, seeing some types of information as more acceptable for the device to collect and share than others. Interviewees saw steps, sleep, and general fitness data as acceptable, but personal identifiers or location data clearly fell outside what was allowed.

Many of our participants expressed an inherent trust in their fitness tracker company, assuming that the company already had privacy rules in place to properly limit the flow of their PFI. Many could not remember adjusting their privacy settings or assumed the default settings were still in place, essentially trusting privacy rules pre-set by the fitness tracker company. Furthermore, participants appeared to give the company the benefit of the doubt because they had not heard negative news about the company, (e.g., a security breach, PFI used in inappropriate ways).

Turbulence

CPM suggests that when privacy rules break down, ‘turbulence’ emerges between the co-owners of a piece of information and reduce trust between the original owner of the information and those who disrupted a privacy rule. The potential for turbulence was apparent in our interviewees’ concerns that PFI might be combined with more personal data, comingled with location data, or shared outside the expected contexts. However, this concern was tempered for many participants by the fact that they had not heard of such cases

or were not aware if such activities were occurring. Again, this suggests that media coverage of the practices of fitness tracker companies could help inform users about how their PFI is being used. Our findings also reveal a potential for turbulence, since most respondents reported limited engagement with the privacy settings for their fitness tracker. This suggests that data sharing might very well be prevalent, yet unbeknownst to users.

Conclusions and future work

Our study sought to identify benefits and drawbacks from the use of fitness trackers and to leverage Communication Privacy Management theory to gain a better understanding of how fitness tracker users manage privacy boundaries related to personal fitness information. Our findings revealed that the perceived benefits of using fitness trackers greatly outweigh drawbacks. They also show how users do (or do not) exert control over their PFI and establish basic privacy rules to govern how PFI might flow to other individuals. Yet, limited engagement with privacy settings for fitness trackers, combined with fear over PFI being co-mingled with other personal information, leads to the potential for privacy turbulence to emerge related to PFI.

As Lupton (2016) notes, ‘the use and ownership of personal data by actors and agencies other than the individual who generates these data are beginning to have major implications for social discrimination and justice issues’ (pp. 86–87). The potential turbulence evident in our findings suggest that similar implications might emerge regarding users’ lack of control over their PFI within the fitness tracker ecosystem. As news stories continue to emerge where health providers, insurance companies, and law enforcement agencies gain access to PFI, the potential for turbulence increases and users’ existing indifference about the privacy of their PFI might quickly change to angst and a desire to gain more control over PFI or even stop using the platforms altogether.

The potential for turbulence could be mitigated if companies like Fitbit take cues from other internet companies like Facebook and Google, which have taken steps to spotlight privacy features more clearly within the user experience. For example, Facebook introduced its Privacy Checkup features in 2014 to alert users when they are about to share content publicly and to provide a walkthrough of the site’s many privacy settings (Rosenblatt, 2014). Likewise, Google has implemented a Security Checkup that takes the user through connected accounts, authorisations, and two-factor authentication (Whitney, 2017). Fitness tracking companies could also embrace a more transparent stance on how they use the data they collect from users, as has been shown in design-based mockups like the ‘privacy nutrition label’ (Kelley, Bresee, Cranor, & Reeder, 2009).

That said, compelling fitness tracker providers to take proactive measures to foster privacy management will likely face resistance, as the nature of the self-tracking industry is to encourage the open flow of personal information. However, as Pantzar and Ruckenstein argue (2015), ‘the normalization of self-tracking ... paves the way for both new practices and new market engagements’ (pp. 94–95), reminding us that it can be in the interest of fitness-tracking platforms to help reduce turbulence in order to ensure wider market adoption of their products.

Further, our initial findings urge us to explore additional implications for the CPM model itself in the context of fitness tracking and personal fitness information. As suggested by Vitak’s (2016) discussion of how best to apply CPM to technologically

mediated interactions, future work should focus on the role of particular contexts related to sharing PFI. For example, there is growing interest in using fitness trackers as part of workplace wellness programs (Gorm & Shklovski, 2016), and it would be useful to investigate whether users manage their privacy boundaries differently when sharing PFI with employers or health insurance companies compared to sharing it within their social networks. Further work can also explore how the affordances of the fitness tracker platforms themselves – including differences across wearable device designs, mobile app interfaces, and website layout – might affect users’ ability to manage privacy boundaries.

Wearable devices, including fitness trackers, are likely to become even more pervasive in everyday life. Understanding how users manage privacy boundaries around the information these devices generate is crucial to ensuring that increased adoption of the devices does not also result in increased privacy risks for the people who use them.

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